In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the history and current state of relations between the USSR and one of the largest regions of the world - Latin America. This is largely due to the growth of these contacts in the 60s and 70s, and the growing tendencies in Latin American countries to pursue a truly independent foreign policy, which is also reflected in the active development of their relations with the USSR. This important fact was reflected in the Report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, at the XXV Congress of the CPSU, who noted the noticeable expansion of relations between the USSR and Latin American countries. 1 In addition, this interest is caused by the growing role of Latin American States in international life and their entry into the world arena.

Soviet-Latin American relations have recently been reflected in a number of monographic works .2 The study of the very history of these relations in the 1920s and 30s-the period of their origin and formation not only in the USSR, but also abroad-has intensified .3 A number of articles have appeared that explore some of the problems of the history of relations between the USSR and Latin American countries .4
Thanks to these publications, the picture of the development of relations between the USSR and Latin America has become clearer and enriched with new interesting data. However, the Soviet Union's relations with Latin America in the 1930s remain almost unexplored. So, in the sections " History of International Relations and Foreign Policy of the USSR "(vol. 1, Moscow, 1967) and the book " The USSR and Latin America. 1917-1967", which dealt with the 1930s, refers only to the position of the USSR in the League of Nations in connection with the Bolivian-Paraguayan war and briefly reports on the relations of the Soviet Union with Uruguay. This period is also not covered in foreign historiography. Meanwhile, the 1930s played an important role in the development of the pre-war system of Soviet-Latin American relations, which made it possible for the USSR to cooperate with Latin American countries in the League of Nations and other international organizations, and the normalization of bilateral relations became a reality.-

1 See Materials of the XXV Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, p. 21.

2 " The USSR and Latin America. 1917-1967". Moscow, 1967; "History of foreign policy of the USSR. 1917-1975". In two volumes, vol. 1. 1917-1945, Moscow, 1976; A. I. Sizonenko. Essays on the history of Soviet-Latin American Relations, Moscow, 1971.

3 N. Cardenas. Las relacjones mexicano-sovieticas. Antecedentes y primeros contactos diplomatics (1789 - 1927). Mexico. 1974.

4 A. P. Malkov, V. M. Marchenko. Activities of Yuzhamtorg. "New and Recent History", 1968, N 4; B. V. Lukin. The first program of Soviet scientific research in Latin America. "Latin America", 1972, N 1; A. I. Sizonenko. Soviet Russia and Latin America in 1917-1924 "Voprosy istorii", 1973, N 6.

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In this context, the Soviet Union and countries such as Mexico, for example, have similar or similar positions on the cardinal problems of that time.

In this article, based on the volumes of "Documents of the USSR Foreign Policy" published in recent years, as well as some other sources, an attempt is made to analyze the development of Soviet-Latin American relations in the 1930s. At the same time, attention is paid to those issues that have not yet been found or have been poorly reflected in the works already mentioned above, primarily relations between the Soviet Union and Latin American countries in the field of foreign policy.

Proceeding from the general course of Lenin's foreign policy, the Soviet Union tirelessly fought for the consolidation of peace in the pre-war years, and actively pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence in the international arena. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government paid constant attention to foreign policy issues. In 1930, the XVI Party Congress instructed the Central Committee to continue to pursue "a firm and resolute policy of peace" and to ensure "the further development of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world."5 It was precisely in terms of these decisions that the Soviet Union's activities in the 1930s took place, both in various international organizations and in bilateral relations. In the course of this activity, Soviet diplomacy established contacts and collaborated with representatives of Latin American countries, seeking to work together with them to solve important international problems of that time in a positive way. The first contacts of this kind date back to February - March 1928, when the USSR participated in the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Conference on Disarmament, which also included Argentina and Chile. 6 At the next sixth session in 1929, Colombia joined the commission.

In 1931, a special international committee was established to review the draft economic non-aggression pact submitted by the Soviet Union. It consists of representatives of Uruguay and Chile. At its November 1931 session, the committee generally approved the Soviet proposals, the essence of which was to recognize the possibility of peaceful coexistence of States with different socio-economic systems and the inadmissibility of discrimination of some countries by others in the economic field. It is important to note that the delegations of Uruguay and Chile supported the Soviet position .7 In June 1933, the USSR took part in the London International Economic Conference. The speech of the head of the Soviet delegation, Mikhail Litvinov, was also addressed to the representatives of Latin American countries who were present there. Litvinov stressed the USSR's interest in purchasing large quantities of goods totaling hundreds of millions of dollars produced, in particular, in Latin America, such as non-ferrous metals, leather raw materials, coffee, cocoa, and rubber .8
A new important step in strengthening and expanding relations between the USSR and Latin America in international organizations was associated with the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations in September 1934. Mexico played a role in inviting the Soviet Union to join the organization. Its position was largely explained by the fact that the new government of this country, which began to carry out anti-imperialist reforms, was not able to do so.-

5 "The CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences and plenums of the Central Committee". Ed. 8-e, p. 408.

6 "History of Foreign Policy of the USSR", Part I. 1917-1945, Moscow, 1966, p. 460; A.V. Lunacharsky. Articles and Speeches on international policy Issues, Moscow, 1959.

7 " Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR "(DVP), vol. XIV, Moscow, 1968, p. 674.

8 M. M. Litvinov. Foreign Policy of the USSR, Moscow, 1937, p. 328.

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Since 1934, it has raised the issue of restoring diplomatic relations with the USSR, which were interrupted in the beginning of 1930, and thus expressed its interest in the overall improvement of bilateral relations.

At the beginning of September 1934, the Mexican Charge d'affaires in Poland visited the adviser of the USSR mission in Warsaw and asked him to convey to the Soviet Government that Mexico would vote for the admission of the USSR to the League of Nations and grant it a permanent seat there, and would also influence other Latin American republics in the same spirit9 . Soon the Soviet Government received a telegram signed by a significant number of members of the League of Nations, including representatives of Latin America-Mexico, Chile, Haiti, and Uruguay-inviting them to join the League of Nations .10 Only Argentina and Panama abstained from voting at the League Assembly on the invitation of the USSR from Latin American countries"11 . On September 18, 1934, the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations. This step increased its capabilities in the struggle for peace, contributed to the growth of the USSR's authority on the world stage. In this connection, the opinion expressed by the Argentine international historian A. de Yuliis that "the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations meant automatic recognition of the Soviet Government by all members of the League of Nations"12 (and this included a large group of Latin American States) is not without interest.

During its five-year stay in the League of Nations, the delegation of the Soviet Union repeatedly not only maintained contacts with representatives of Latin America, but also spoke on issues related to this continent. One of the first actions of this kind was the active participation of the USSR in the autumn of 1934 in the discussion of ways to resolve the Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict peacefully. A special committee set up for its consideration has developed appropriate recommendations for both sides to end the war. The Soviet delegation proposed: (1) Set a specific time limit for the adoption of these recommendations, which should be as short as possible, so as to allow both Governments sufficient time for decision-making and consultation, and, on the other hand, to prevent the armies from using this time interval for launching offensive operations and further territorial seizures; (2) that the embargo outlined in the recommendations should be of the nature of It was more stringent and prohibited not only the supply and sale, but also the transit of weapons .13 "The great distance," said Litvinov, the head of the Soviet delegation to the League of Nations, " separating us from the theater of military operations, and the relatively small number of armed forces involved in them, should not detract in our eyes from the importance of the problem. The decisions that we make here can have very important implications in dealing with more serious conflicts. " 14 The Soviet delegation advocated that the resolutions of the Assembly of the League of Nations on this question should be more decisive and that it should show firmness in implementing them .15
In January 1936, the League of Nations considered breaking off relations with the USSR by Uruguay. Litvinov sharply condemned the Uruguayan government-

9 DVP. T. XVII. M. 1972, p. 581.

10 Ibid., pp. 589-590.

11 See I. S. Ivanov. Latin American countries and the League of Nations. "Latin America", 1973, N 5, p. 135.

12 A. de IuIiis. Relaciones diplomaticas ruso-argentinas. Buenos Aires. 1946, p. 34.

13 M. Litvinov. Foreign policy of the USSR. Speeches and statements. 1927-1937. Moscow, 1937, p. 118.

14 Ibid., p. 119.

15 Ibid.

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a petition for groundless severance of relations with the USSR. In his response, the representative of Uruguay could not provide any justification for this step, which again showed that it was completely groundless. The discussion of this issue at the League of Nations drew broad international responses. Well-known French columnist J. Taboui, in her article "Soviet Success in Geneva," wrote:: "The Uruguayan delegate received an order from his Government not to touch the question of evidence, since it did not exist."16 The decision of the Council of the League of Nations, adopted after the consideration of this question, expressed the hope that the break in diplomatic relations between Uruguay and the USSR would be temporary, and that both countries would use a favorable opportunity to restore these relations .17 This decision was regarded as a major political success of the USSR. The resolution, although indirectly, condemned the act of the Uruguayan government, proposed to restore relations, and also recognized that Uruguay had no reason to break off diplomatic relations with the USSR.

One of the most striking pages in the activity of the USSR in the League of Nations was, as is well known, its resolute condemnation of the aggressions of the fascist powers in Ethiopia and Spain and its defense of republican Spain. The position of the Soviet Union on these issues coincided with that of one of the largest Latin American countries, Mexico, which branded the fascist rebellion in Spain a disgrace, and also provided material and military assistance to the Spanish Republicans. Mexico, like the USSR, opposed the Western powers ' policy of "non-interference"in the League of Nations. Both countries rightly regarded it as a policy of complicity with Franco and the Fascist aggressors. It is not by chance that a member of the Soviet delegation to the League of Nations, I. M. Maisky, described the Mexicans as "our friends." 18
The Soviet delegation, speaking in defense of Republican Spain, resolutely rejected, in particular, the attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of that country made by Edwards, the representative of Chile in the League of Nations. In January 1937, he submitted to the League of Nations a proposal to ensure the departure of several thousand Franco supporters from Spain, who had taken refuge in foreign diplomatic missions in Madrid. Edwards insisted on sending an international commission to Spain with the authority to remove the evacuation of these individuals from the hands of its legitimate Government. Even during the initial discussion of this issue at a closed meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, Litvinov noted that Spain in this case did not violate any treaty, principles of international law or the Charter of the League of Nations, and the Council has no political or legal grounds to consider the issue of the right of asylum in the international aspect. "Such a review," Litvinov stressed, "would be unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of a member State of the League of Nations." 19 On January 27, 1937, the head of the Soviet delegation again opposed Edwards ' proposal. The latter eventually had to abandon its demand and agree to direct negotiations with the legitimate Government of Spain .20
While advocating the universality and strength of the League of Nations, the Soviet delegation expressed regret at withdrawing from the organization

16 "Ouvre" (Paris), 24.I.1936.

17 "Pravda", 25. I. 1936.

18 I. M. Maisky. Memoirs of a Soviet diplomat in 1925-1945, Moscow, 1971, p. 326.

19 M. Litvinov. Foreign policy of the USSR. Speeches and statements. 1927-1937, p. 189.

20 M. M. Litvinov. In the Struggle for Peace, Moscow, 1938, p. 180.

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in 1936-1937. Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. "We regret their departure," Litvinov said at the plenary session of the League of Nations, "because we value the cooperation of all countries, large and small." 21
The activities of the USSR in the League of Nations and other international organizations on issues related to Latin America have convincingly shown that the Soviet Union has always been committed to strengthening peace and security in this region, developing cooperation with Latin American States and protecting their national interests. Establishing permanent contacts with representatives of Latin American countries created conditions for establishing mutual understanding between them and the USSR, identifying their points of view on the most important foreign policy problems of that period.

Bilateral contacts in the diplomatic sphere occupied a certain place in the system of pre-war Soviet-Latin American relations. The establishment and strengthening of these relations were constantly met with opposition from reactionary circles in these countries. In January 1930, the Mexican Government, under the pressure of internal reaction and the pressure of imperialist forces, broke off diplomatic relations with the USSR. At that time, the Soviet country had diplomatic relations with only one Latin American state - Uruguay. To a certain extent, Soviet-Uruguayan relations were reinforced by mutual trade of both countries, as well as by the fact that since 1931 the Yuzhamtorg society was located in Montevideo, which promoted the development of trade between the USSR and South America. However, since 1934, there have been positive developments in the field of official interstate relations. In the spring of 1934, at the suggestion of the Uruguayan Government, the missions of Uruguay and the USSR were opened in Moscow and Montevideo. In May of the same year, negotiations began on the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Mexico. They were initiated by Mexico on May 3, 1934. Her charge d'affaires in Poland informed Podolsky, adviser to the USSR Mission in Warsaw, that he had received a letter from his Foreign Ministry stating "a desire to establish (i.e. restore) diplomatic relations." 22
Mexico's turn to normalize relations with the USSR was not accidental. He was associated with the anti-imperialist program of the country's presidential candidate , General L. Cardenas, 23 who was then conducting the final stage of his election campaign in May. After Cardenas ' election victory in July 1934, negotiations on the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries continued. The position of the Mexican Government followed logically from the general nature of the independent and independent foreign policy course of its new Government. At the first stage of the negotiations, the Soviets stressed that if the Mexican government applied " directly to Moscow or through diplomatic representatives of both countries with a written proposal for the immediate and unconditional restoration of relations, we would give our consent to this."24 The Soviet leaders did not see the need for special negotiations on this issue. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov noted that the only question that the Soviet side would be willing to discuss was the question of satisfaction for the form of severing relations in 1930, but immediately added that "we are ready not to insist on this." 25
21 Ibid.

22 DVP. T. XVII, pp. 314-315.

23 A. F. Shulgovsky. Mexico at a sharp turn in its history, Moscow, 1967, p. 84.

24 DVP. T. XVII, p. 462.

25 Ibid.

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This reply was transmitted by the USSR Envoy to Poland, J. H. Davtyan, to the Charge d'affaires of Mexico in Poland, Rivas, who, in turn, said that he would telegraph this to his government. In a September 1934 interview with Davtyan, Rivas expressed the opinion that the issue of normalizing diplomatic relations "will arise practically at the beginning of January under the new government"26 (on December 1, 1934, Cardenas was to officially assume the post of President of Mexico). In December 1934, a member of the Mexican delegation to the League of Nations, Ambassador of Mexico in Paris, K. Najera informed Litvinov that he had received instructions from his Government to resume diplomatic relations between the USSR and Mexico through a simultaneous exchange of notes. He believed that this exchange could be made in January 1935 at the session of the Council of the League of Nations .27 In January 1935, the issue of normalizing relations was discussed by Litvinov and Nahera in Geneva. As a result of this meeting, an agreement was reached to continue negotiations between the diplomatic missions of the USSR and Mexico in Paris28 . In February, Najera reported that "the Mexican government has already approved in principle the draft exchange of notes." 29 From April 1935, Soviet-Mexican contacts continued through the embassies of both countries in England.

The broadest circles of the Mexican public were in favor of resuming relations with the USSR. The friendly attitude of the Mexican people towards the Soviet Union was reported, for example, in August 1935 by the Mexican Envoy to Denmark, A. Saens, to the USSR Envoy to Sweden, A. M. Kollontai. Saenz told her that it was necessary to "work" to restore relations between the two countries. "We are now," he stressed, "closer to you than ever before." 30 In response, Kollontai reasonably told Saenz that "it's up to the Mexicans themselves"31 . Shortly before that, Ojeda, the Mexican Envoy to Sweden, met with Kollontai. As the Soviet plenipotentiary reported in the NKID, "he very fervently asked her to 'influence' Moscow so that we in the Union would change the attitude towards Mexico and create a more favorable atmosphere for restoring relations." 32
A new step to accelerate the resolution of the question of resuming Soviet-Mexican relations was taken in September 1936, when the Soviet side decided to establish diplomatic relations with Mexico immediately and without any preconditions .33 Thanks to the initiative of Soviet diplomacy, real opportunities have opened up for the rapid normalization of relations between the two countries. It seemed that a solution to this issue was about to follow. In this regard, the conversation between Litvinov in Geneva and the Mexican envoy in London, a member of the Mexican delegation to the League of Nations, N. Bassols, on September 21, 1936, is of interest. Bassols said that he had previously been to Mexico, " knows the mood of the president, I am sure of his inclination to restore relations." "I reminded him," Litvinov reported to Moscow, "that now, in view of our common interests, we are ready to restore relations without any conditions." 34 By" common interests " Litvinov meant not only the mutual desire of the USSR and Mexico to resume relations, but also their common points of view on the most important issues.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., p. 757.

28 DVP. T. XVIII. M. 1973, p. 32.

29 Ibid., p. 92.

30 Ibid., p. 468.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 469.

33 DVP. T. XIX. Moscow, 1974, pp. 426-427.

34 Ibid., p. 762.

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international issues of the last few days, such as denouncing the Francoist rebellion and helping Republican Spain.

Immediately after the meeting, Bassols sent a letter with Soviet proposals to Mexico City. Then, when meeting with Maisky in London, he said that his letter was received favorably by the president and that he "hopes to receive instructions from Mexico in the coming days to restore relations." 35 However, the decision of this case was suspended. On December 17, 1936, a member of the Soviet delegation to the League of Nations, B. E. Stein, telegraphed to the NKID of the USSR: "Bassols said that the president considers this moment inconvenient for reasons of his domestic policy."36 In explaining the reasons for Cardenas ' decision, it is probably necessary to proceed primarily from the fact that his Government experienced a twofold pressure on the issue of resuming relations with the USSR: on the one hand, the progressive forces and popular masses of Mexico, who were in favor of normalizing relations with the Soviet country, and on the other - resistance from internal reaction and imperialist circles. The pressure of the latter, as well as the fears of the ruling circles of Mexico in connection with the aggravation of the struggle of workers, especially oil workers , 37 for their rights at the end of 1936, had their effect on the bourgeois government of Cardenas. However, the issue of restoring diplomatic relations with the USSR was not removed from the agenda of Mexico's political life. At a mass rally in Mexico City on November 7, 1937, organized by the Confederation of Workers of the country on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, speakers, including Bassols, called for the restoration of relations with the USSR .38
In 1935, the USSR established diplomatic relations with Colombia. To a certain extent, this was due to the coming to power of the gam in 1934 of the government of the liberal party led by the leader of the left liberals, President A. Lopez, whose policy on a number of issues was progressive, anti-imperialist. 39 The procedure for establishing a relationship was completed quite quickly. On June 2, 1935, the Colombian envoy informed the USSR Envoy to Italy Stein of Colombia's intention to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR .40 On June 25 of the same year, the Soviet Envoy and the Colombian Envoy to Italy exchanged notes on the establishment of normal diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries .41 As noted in the President's message to Congress in 1935, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Colombia and the USSR was a direct consequence of the positive vote on the invitation of the Soviet Union to the League of Nations and our country's entry into this organization .42
There were also prospects for trade between Colombia and the USSR. To a certain extent, this was evidenced by the visit of the secretary and commercial attache of the Colombian mission in Washington, G. Fernandez, to the Soviet mission in the United States in September 1935. In a conversation with Soviet diplomats, he expressed his country's interest in trade with the USSR. "We believe," Mr. Fernandez said, " that although Colombia is a small country and a small amount of goods can be exported to the Soviet Union, nevertheless, products such as coffee can be imported into the Soviet Union.-

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 See A. F. Shulgovsky. Op. ed., pp. 351-352.

38 N. Bassols. Obras. Mexico. 1964, p. 365. Relations between the USSR and Mexico were restored in 1942. 39 See V. M. Pchela. The working class of Colombia and the politics of A. Lopez. "Latin America", 1972. N 4.

40 DVP. T. XVIII, p. 260.

41 Ibid., p. 409. The exchange of ambassadors took place in 1943.

42 "Mensaje Presidencial al Congreso de 1935". Bogota. 1935, p. 68.

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tokens, bananas, platinum, can be exported. We, for our part, could import a whole range of goods from the USSR." 43 Fernandez said that the Colombian side intended to "study the Soviet economy in more detail, especially exports and imports." He asked to be provided with relevant digital materials, in particular on Soviet coffee imports, in order to find out what goods might have been imported from the USSR to Colombia. The Embassy of the USSR handed over the latest issues of the Economic Review of Soviet Union to the Colombian diplomat .44
In 1935, Soviet-Argentine contacts also revived. They were connected with the probe of the Argentine side regarding the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the USSR. It was undertaken in September 1935 by the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies of the province of Buenos Aires, a member of the leadership of the Conservative Party of Argentina, Kaiser, who specially came to the Soviet mission in Montevideo to meet with the USSR envoy A. E. Minkin. Minkin said with good reason that the initiative in this case "should come from the country that did not respond to notifications about the new government coming to power in Russia in 1917," and reminded Kaiser that in 1925, the USSR plenipotentiary in Rome officially proposed to Argentina to normalize diplomatic relations. However, Minkin stressed that in the event of such a step by the Argentine government, "the peoples of the USSR will welcome the restoration of friendly relations with the Argentine people." 45
Apparently, the Kaiser did not conduct the probe only on his own behalf. During the conversation, he said that the establishment of relations is supported, in particular, by the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Trade of Argentina Groppe. To some extent, this indicated that the raid on the office of Yuzhamtorg in Buenos Aires in 1931, the termination of its activities in the country and the subsequent sharp decline in Soviet-Argentine trade negatively affected the economy of this country. In 1935, the volume of Soviet-Argentine trade decreased to 2.3 million rubles. compared to 16.5 million rubles in 1930 46 . In 1931, up to 50% of all Soviet exports to Latin America and up to 70% of imports from these countries came from Argentina .47 A month later, in October 1935, Minkin wrote to Moscow that the head of the commercial department of the Argentine Foreign Ministry, Antokolets, informed him that the Argentine ambassador in Rome, Contillo, had been instructed to enter into negotiations with Litvinov "regarding the legalization of passports of Argentines living in the USSR." "It is assumed," Minkin wrote,"that negotiations on restoring relations will begin in this way." If Contillo did not meet with Litvinov, he was supposed to start negotiations about it with the USSR envoy to Italy Stein 48 . However, as Stein later reported, Contillo did not contact him. 49
Argentina's position was primarily due to the vacillation and inconsistency characteristic of the bourgeois governments of that time in the issue of normalizing relations with the USSR. However,

43 DVP. T. XVIII. p. 517.

44 Ibid.

45 Such an opportunity was presented to Argentina even earlier, in 1924, after G. V. Chicherin's interview with the Argentine newspaper Nacion, in which he stated that "the resumption of relations between Argentina and the Soviet Union would meet the interests of both the Soviet Union and Argentina." "La Nacion" (Buenos Aires), 24.VI.1924.

46 "Foreign trade of the USSR. 1918-1966", Moscow, 1967, p. 13.

47 DVP. T. XIV, p. 811.

48 DVP. T. XVIII, p. 540.

49 Ibid., p. 663.

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The steps taken by Argentina were evidence of the Soviet Union's significantly increased prestige in the 1930s, which could no longer be ignored in international affairs.

In the 1930s, the movement for establishing relations with the USSR was also taking place in other Latin American countries. For example, in Chile in 1939, the radical Party and the Confederation of Working People called for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR .50 The movement for friendship and strengthening relations with the Soviet Union in Cuba was active .51 It was headed by the Communists, the National Confederation of Workers, the MOPRa branch in Cuba. In 1933-1934. In special manifestos, the Confederation called on workers to mark the seventeenth anniversary of the October Revolution, to oppose attacks on the USSR by the forces of imperialism and fascism, and to show proletarian solidarity with it. 52 In 1934, the Fourth National Workers ' Congress of Trade Union Unity, which met in Havana, adopted a resolution on the struggle against the threat of imperialist war and in defense of the Soviet Union. It pointed out that against the background of the policies of the imperialists and fascists, "The Soviet Union is the only country that actually demonstrates its desire for peace from day to day."53
In the 1930s, Soviet-Latin American cultural and scientific ties continued to develop. In 1930-1932, famous masters of Soviet cinema S. Eisenstein, G. Alexandrov and E. Tisset visited Mexico, who shot the film "Viva Mexico!", in Uruguay and Argentina in 1930. The Moscow Chamber Theater toured with great success, in Moscow in international tournaments in 1935 and 1936.- World champion Jose Raul Capablanca.

A significant contribution to the study of Latin America and the development of Soviet - Latin American scientific ties was made by the trip in 1932-1933 to twelve countries (Mexico, Cuba, Jamaica, Panama, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Trinidad) of the Soviet botanist, Academician N. I. Vavilov. Everywhere he was greeted with cordiality, which spoke of the authority of this scientist and Soviet science in general. Recalling his trip later, he noted " exceptional assistance from scientific and agronomic workers in all the countries where I had to be... I was given exceptional opportunities to get acquainted with all the materials in a short time. I was almost always accompanied by the most competent agronomists and heads of scientific institutions... The interest in the Soviet Union is huge"54 . The deep respect for Vavilov of scientists, for example, Uruguay, is evidenced by a letter to him from the plenipotentiary Minkin. "Together with a group of agricultural engineers, Berger, Fischer and Henry (Uruguayan botanical scientists known far beyond the borders of their country-A. S.), "Minkin reported," we often remember you. They are still in love with you and are "honored" to remember past meetings with you and whether they have any signs of attention on your part. " 55 Vavilov belongs to Osnov-

50 "Essays on the history of Chile", Moscow, 1967, p. 366.

51 In this regard, the collection "Russian - Cuban and Soviet-Cuban relations of the XVIII-XX centuries" published in the USSR and Cuba is of interest. Moscow, 1975 and the book by A. Garcia, P. Mironchuk. Esbozo historico de las relaciones entre Cuba Rusia у Cuba URSS. La Habana. 1976.

52 Archivo nacional de Cuba. Fondo especial, legajo: fuera de caja, N 7 - 10; caja 8, N 108.

53 Ibid., caja 8, N 171.

54 N. I. Vavilov. Five Continents, Moscow, 1962, p. 231.

55 Leningrad State Archive of the October Revolution and Socialist Construction, f. 9708, op. 1, 887, l. 76.

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great contribution to the formation and establishment of Soviet-Latin American scientific ties 56 .

Contacts in the field of literary and public relations continued. Such prominent representatives of Latin American literature as Cesar Vallejo (Peru), Jose Mancidor (Mexico), a well-known figure of the Latin American and Mexican trade union movement Lombardo Toledano and others came to the USSR. Translations of works of Latin American and Soviet literature were published in the USSR and Latin American countries.

In 1937, a direct non-stop flight from Moscow to Brazil was planned, with a landing in Pernambuco. Its plan was developed in the summer of 1936, and the famous crew of M. Gromov (commander), A. Yumashev and S. Danilin was preparing to implement it .57 However, it was not possible to make this flight to the homeland of one of the world's first pilots, Santos Dumont. The Brazilian government, as Pravda wrote, sent a response through the consulates of the intermediary powers to the request to accept Soviet aircraft. It contained flattering praise for the Soviet pilots, admiration for their courage and bravery and ... refusal of the request 58 .

The facts of the history of Soviet-Latin American relations in the 1930s allow us to conclude that in general, despite the small volume of diplomatic relations and certain difficult moments (the raid on Yuzhamtorg, the break in relations with the USSR by Uruguay at the end of 1935), these relations continued to develop. In comparison with the 1920s, relations between the USSR and Latin American countries in the period under review became more versatile, covering a wider range of issues and problems. Their objective analysis completely refutes the obviously biased conclusion of the English bourgeois author S. Clissold, who claims to be a specialist in the history of Soviet-Latin American relations, that their balance in the two pre-war decades was allegedly "decidedly negative" 59 . It was in the 1920s and 30s that the foundation was laid for relations between the USSR and Latin American countries, important steps were taken in their formation, and prerequisites were created for their further development. It is no coincidence that their new stage began soon after, during the Second World War, when 12 Latin American countries turned to the USSR with a proposal to establish diplomatic relations, which was implemented.

56 See A. I. Sizonenko. Contribution of Academician N. I. Vavilov to the study of Latin America. "Latin America", 1972, N 3.

57 p. Gershberg. Our work is like this. Moscow, 1971, p. 315.

58 Pravda, 13. VII. 1937.

59 "The Soviet Union and Latin America". N. Y. 1970, p. 22.

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