The monograph of the researcher of the Institute of General History of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Historical Sciences I. I. Yanchuk, is based on a wide range of sources. These are primarily published materials of the US State Department and Congress, documents of the German Foreign Ministry, memoirs, diaries and biographies of prominent American politicians and diplomats, extensive periodicals, as well as numerous works by Marxist and bourgeois authors.

The author made an attempt to comprehensively review the US foreign policy activity in Latin America. The study, along with finding out the general trends of US policy in Latin America during World War II, also reveals the most important aspects of US relations with countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia and Panama.

Noting that Brazil was the main support of Washington on the continent, the author convincingly shows that the deep contradictions between the United States and Argentina, Mexico and Bolivia were based not so much on their different approach to the question of participation in World War II, but on the imperialist claims of the United States, its desire for hegemony on the Latin American continent. The author deals with the issues of US military policy and foreign economic relations, and at the same time emphasizes that the specific methods of US Latin American policy were aimed at achieving the invariable goal of American imperialism - establishing complete and undivided domination in the Western hemisphere (p.5). The book develops a periodization of Washington's Latin American policy during World War II, analyzes the characteristics and features of each stage of this policy: 1939 - 1940, 1940 - 1942, 1943 - 1945 years. The author notes the aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions between the United States and fascist Germany in Latin America on the eve of the war. "The contradictions between the United States and Britain, which were characteristic of the previous period, were inferior in severity to the contradictions between the United States and a new strong rival in Latin America - fascist Germany" (pp. 9-10). I. I. Yanchuk cites a lot of data describing various forms of conflict between the interests of the United States and fascist Germany in Latin America. German penetration into the region was complex, combining economic, political, ideological, and military objectives, albeit on a comparatively limited scale. But on the other hand, the Third Reich's efforts were focused primarily on Argentina,

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Brazil and Chile, which sometimes upset the balance in favor of Berlin (especially in Argentina).

The numerous facts contained in the book show how many different means (from economic pressure to armed intervention based on "collective sanctions") the United States sought to prevent any undesirable internal political changes in the countries of the Western hemisphere (p. 26, 53, 62). All this led, the monograph notes, to the fact that German influence in Latin American countries weakened by the end of the 1930s and continued to decline in subsequent years (pp. 14-15). The exception was Argentina. I. I. Yanchuk devotes many substantial pages to the analysis of the country's controversial policy, which combines significant pro - German tendencies with obvious anti - Americanism (pp. 182-187, 220-246).

The author was able to link the consideration of the international situation in the western hemisphere with the course of the Second World War as a whole. Since its inception, there have been changes in Washington's Latin American policy that have largely reflected the course and outcome of events in Europe. From the very first weeks of the war, the United States stepped up efforts to consolidate its position in the Western hemisphere. I. I. Yanchuk reveals in detail and argumentatively the entire range of activities carried out by US policy and diplomacy during the first year of the war. Among them: holding emergency Pan-American conferences, establishing a 300-mile "security zone" and introducing patrols by US military vessels within the specified zone, extraordinary loans to Latin American countries as the most effective means of subordinating them to their influence. Taking advantage of the difficult economic situation of these countries, the US tried to impose its demands on Mexico, Bolivia and other states that nationalized US oil companies (pp. 42-45). Influential sections of the American bourgeoisie did not want to make concessions to the countries of the Latin American continent on the issue of expanding the import of competing goods to the United States, primarily agricultural products. That is why the leading countries of the region sharply opposed the US claims to establish military, economic and political dominance in Latin America.

The most characteristic feature of US policy in Latin America at the beginning of the war-from the Panama Conference (September 1939) to the Havana Conference (July 1940) - was an increase in direct pressure to strengthen its positions. A special place in the book is given to the Havana Consultative Conference of 1940, which was held at a time when events in Western Europe took on a particularly dramatic character. Leading figures in Washington feared that the military successes of Nazi Germany in Europe would be followed by a concentrated offensive against US positions in the western hemisphere. In seeking to create a military alliance in the region, the United States has been forced to shift from direct pressure tactics to maneuvering and making concessions. Conflicts with Mexico and Bolivia were urgently resolved, loans were granted to a number of Latin American countries, and agreements were signed on the supply of Latin American strategic goods and raw materials to the United States. It is characteristic, however, that the new phenomena in Washington's politics took real form only after June 1941.

The US economic policy in Latin America after the Havana Conference was ambivalent, reflecting the contradictions of US foreign policy in this period as a whole. According to the author, the latter was reduced to, on the one hand, ousting its competitors from this region and establishing itself there as a completely dominant power (especially since "ousting" was conveniently covered up by concern for the" security " of the western hemisphere); on the other, to prepare one of the most solid economic rear areas for war with Germany (p. 120). The extension of the lend-lease law to Latin American countries has played an important role in drawing this region into the channel of US foreign policy. The author comes to the conclusion that on the eve of the US entry into World War II, despite some difficulties and opposition from a number of regional states, "a military-political bloc has developed in Latin America, which is currently directed against the Axis powers "(p.158).

Using the example of the next Pan-American conference in Rio de Janeiro in January 1942, I. I. Yanchuk reveals the ongoing struggle of opinions in the ruling circles

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United States on the methods of Latin American politics. Argentina was still in opposition to the foreign policy of the United States, even trying from time to time to put together a bloc of South American states in opposition to the United States. Responding to the reproaches of US Secretary of State C. Hall, who accused the Argentine government of inaction in relation to the espionage activities of fascist states on its territory, the Argentine ambassador in Washington pointed out on October 21, 1942 that the leaders of his country act on the assumption that the results of the war may be successful for both sides (page 183). In connection with this position of Argentina, Hell insisted on pursuing a tough policy towards it, up to a complete break. He was vigorously opposed by Undersecretary of State S. Welles, who relied on a policy of concessions. Welles ' position was also supported by President Roosevelt. In the first months after entering the war, the United States did not want to risk an aggravation of relations with Argentina, which continued to supply raw materials to the United States. In addition, an open break between the United States and Argentina could lead to the departure of some Latin American countries from the United States.

The book shows that the United States considered Latin America primarily as a supplier of raw materials for its military industry. The United States did not encourage active participation of Latin Americans in the war. According to the author, "the role of Latin American countries during World War II could have been more significant if not for the policy of the United States, which was afraid of the active participation of the countries of the Western hemisphere in the struggle against fascism" (p. 316).

The author conducts a well-reasoned polemic with bourgeois historians. In the final part of the work devoted to the creation of a regional bloc in the Western hemisphere at the final stage of World War II, the author refutes the point of view of those American historians who claim that the United States allegedly did not seek to create a military bloc in the western hemisphere, but, on the contrary, met the demands of Latin American countries themselves. evidence that the United States sought to preserve the military bases provided to it for temporary use during the war, insisted on the standardization of weapons, advocated the creation of a military bloc in Latin America, seeking to strengthen and expand its political influence there, and even more economically subdue the countries of this region. After the Battle of Kursk, when the inevitability of the defeat of nazi Germany became clear, the United States gradually began to abandon the concessions previously granted to the countries of the continent. The US position at the final stage of the war became increasingly rigid: promises of assistance in industrialization were withdrawn, private entrepreneurship was increasingly stimulated, and agreements on the purchase of raw materials were terminated. Relying on the military-political bloc that emerged during the war, the United States tried to use it to create a pro-American "voting machine" at the UN.

An analysis of US policy in Latin America in 1939-1945, as the author points out, makes it possible to conclude that during the Second World War, "American capital established its position in the western hemisphere, increased the exploitation of the continent's natural resources and increased the semi-colonial dependence of Latin America" (p. 316). I. I. Yanchuk traces new phenomena in US politics - the evolution of the Pan-American organization from an administrative and legal institution to a military-political union created on the basis of the experience of the war years in 1947, the emergence and development of new forms of expansion (state economic "aid" and "mixed companies"), the use of the Pan-American organization as a tool of US pressure in the UN and etc. Special attention is paid to the forms of ideological expansion of the United States in Latin America, especially since in the post-war period the main elements of it were adopted by US diplomacy.

In the post-war period, Washington transferred the experience of its Latin American policy to other parts of the world, mainly in relations with developing countries. The methods of neocolonialism tried in Latin America continue to be used in Washington's foreign policy arsenal to this day (p.318).

The reviewed work is not free from some shortcomings. The author paid little attention to the problem of Anglo-American co-operation.-

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perennials in Latin America. The last chapter - "Preparing a regional bloc in the Western Hemisphere" - is clearly overloaded with minor details. However, all this does not change the overall favorable impression of the original study, which is one of the first attempts at a concrete analysis of US policy towards Latin America taken as a whole. It would be of great interest to deepen the development of this issue by tracing the relations of the United States with the leading countries of this continent during the Second World War.

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