This article is devoted to the national mythology of Poland, - in particular, to the myth of Polonia semper fidelis, the central myth of national identity. According to this mythology, Poland is essentially and eternally Catholic, it is martyred for the sins of the world but resurrected for its salvation. The author traces the history of this myth since 17th century till nowadays. Then one can find analysis of myth's transformations in Post-Communist period, in particular, in the context of debates about the place of Catholicism and Catholic Church in politics and public sphere. The author shows how this myth divides the Polish society, which leads to a series of conflicts and culture wars between religious conservatives and proponents of secular choice for Poland. In particular, the author analyzes "wars of the cross" after Smolensk plane crash in 2010, phenomenon of "Radio Maria" and the so-called "mohair berets", emergence of new antireligious political forces ("The Palikot Movement"). Article concludes that the myth of Catholic Poland continues to play an important role in the life of the state, but at the same time it becomes more and more a dividing factor which weakens civil society.

Keywords: Poland, national mythology, Catholic Church, Catholicism, cultural war.

ПРЕОБЛАДАЮЩАЯ и вездесущая польская мифология - та, что живет у семейных очагов, циркулирует в публичной сфере и даже повторяется в некоторых научных кру-

* Польша всегда верная (верующая) (лат.).

fidelis? semper Polonia Ж. Zubrzycki Natsional'naya mifologiya, religiya i politika v Pol'she [National Mythology, Religion and Politics in Poland]. 2016. N 3. pp. 44-78.

Zubrzycki, Geneviève (2016) "Polonia semper fidelis? National Mythology, Religion and Politics in Poland", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 34(3): 44-78.

page 44
in Poland and abroad, it reproduces the following scheme: the nation is constantly under threat from dangerous neighbors, Poland is essentially and forever Catholic, its identity is protected by the Roman Catholic Church and protected by its queen-the miraculous Black Madonna, the Czestochowa icon of the Mother of God. Poland, like "Christ among the nations," suffered martyrdom for the sins of the world, but rose again for its salvation. As a reliable bulwark of Christianity, protecting Europe from infidels (whoever they may be), it gave the world a Pope (John Paul II), respectfully referred to as the "Pope of the millennium" and - with pride - "our Pope", who saved the Western world from communism.

Reflecting on the presence of the past in Polish society, historian Norman Davies notes that in Poland, " a poetic approach to history based on imagination and enthusiasm is still more common than a critical, reflective, or analytical approach." And he emphatically declares that "in the Polish tradition, the historical image has proved to be much more convincing than the historical fact." 1 If Davies contrasts "historical image" with" historical fact, " I find it more productive to combine them in the concept of myth. In my use of words, a myth is not a fiction or outright lie that is opposed to historical "truth" and " reality." Rather, they are narratives that a certain social community considers real and meaningful, regardless of whether they are based on historical "facts" or not. Despite the fact that myths often turn out to be the ideological products of protracted conflicts, they look natural and indisputable. Thus, national mythology is a system of myths about the origin, life and purpose of the nation. It emphasizes some aspects of the past and obscures or ignores others, weaves a variety of historical threads into a single fabric, and mixes historical facts with more or less accurate interpretations of these facts. As such, these myths shape understanding of the past, guide public debate, and influence the political sphere.2
1. Davies, N. (1982) God's Playground: A History of Poland, vol. 1: The Origins to 1795, vol. 2: 1795 to the Present, p. 18. New York: Columbia University Press.

2. For national myths and national mythology, see Schöpflin, G. (1997)" The Function of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths", in G. Hosking, G. Schöpflin (eds) Myths and Nationality, pp. 19-35. London: Hurst & Company; Kertzer, D.I. (1988) Ritual,

page 45
Next, I will try to show that the dominant national mythology of Polonia semper fidelis has shaped and continues to shape politics in Poland. More than a quarter of a century after the fall of state socialism, there is still debate in the Polish public space about the place of the Catholic Church in politics and the role of Catholicism in defining the symbolic shape of Polish identity. In my opinion, a myth is at the center of this debate. It is impossible to understand political life in Poland-the debates, clashes, and divisions-without paying serious attention to the national mythology. First, I will examine the construction of the myth of Polish "essential" Catholicism and the Messianic martyrdom of Poland in the nineteenth century, and show how it was woven into the whole fabric of national mythology, which became normative and generally accepted in the twentieth century. I will then focus on the role of national mythology in building a sovereign nation-state after 1989. My analysis will focus on key debates, disputes and trends related to the reformatting of relations between the church, state and civil society in the period after the fall of communism. We will look at the conflict surrounding the church's continued involvement in political life; discuss the new awakening of national mythology caused by the tragic death of President Lech Kaczynski in a plane crash; and the polarization of civil society over the place of religious symbols in Poland, which has become part of the European Union; and analyze discussions about the relationship between Catholicism and the Polish national spirit, which both in the political arena and in the broader cultural space.

Polonia Semper Fidelis how dominant the myth

Although the myth of the original Catholic character of Poland dates back to the "beginning times", that is, to the conversion of Prince Mieszko I to Christianity and the foundation of the Polish state in 966, it is still very much a myth.

Power and Politics,. New Haven: Yale University Press; Smith, A.D. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New York: Blackwell; Smith, A.D. (1999) Myths and Memories of the Nation. London: Oxford University Press; Davies, N. (1997) "Polish Mythologies", in G.A. Hosking, G. Schöpflin (eds) Myths and Nationhood. London: Routledge; Zubrzycki, G. (2011) "History and the National Sensorium: Making Sense of Polish Mythology", Qualitative Sociology 34: 21-57.

page 46
it was first formulated in the 17th century, when several significant historical events took place. In 1653, the Pauline monks of Czestochowa defeated the Swedish invaders (a fact as historical as it is legendary); this miracle was attributed to the presence of the Black Madonna icon in the monastery.3 As a token of gratitude, in 1656 King Jan Casimir entrusted Poland to the protection of the Virgin Mary and proclaimed the icon "Queen of Poland"4. Her cult began to spread during the Catholic Counter-Reformation, clashes with the Ottomans, and threats from infidels.5 Thirty years later, in 1683, King Jan III Sobieski freed Vienna from the Turkish siege, thereby "confirming" Poland's status as an Antemurale christianitatis (bastion of Christianity), which it had enjoyed since the mid-15th century. This was a victory important enough to be commemorated on the wall in Vatican 6.

3. Tazbir, J. (1990) "The Polonization of Christianity in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in D. Loades, K. Walsh (eds) Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience, pp. 117-135. Oxford: Blackwell.

4. Perhaps the traditional Polish motto Polonia semper fidelis (Poland is always faithful) goes back to the vows of loyalty made by the King to the Virgin. These vows were renewed three hundred years later, on August 26, 1956, at a mass in Czestochowa, in the presence of about a million pilgrims. Taking the vows was the first act of the Great Novena, a ritual nine-year period that promoted religious revival and mobilization of the population at a time when Stalinism and its repressions were nearing the end (Osa, M. (1996) " Pastoral Mobilization and Contention: The Religious Foundations of the Solidarity Movement in Poland", in C. Smith (ed.) Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social-Movement Activism, pp. 67-85. New York: Routledge; Wyszyński, S.C. (1996) Zapiski milenijne. Wybór z dziennika "Pro memoria" z lat 1965-1967. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo im. Stefana Kardynała Wyszyńskiego "Soli Deo"; Wyszyński, S.C. (1996) Na szlaku tysiąclecia. Wybór kazań. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo im. Stefana Kardynała Wyszyńskiego "Soli Deo").

5. Tazbir, J. "The Polonization of Christianity in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", p. 119.

6. Tazbir, J. (1986) La République nobiliaire et le monde: Études sur l'histoire de la culture polonaise à l'époque du baroque, pp. 83-102. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk. Previously, before the fall in 1453, this title belonged to Constantinople. From the 15th to the 17th centuries, it was transferred to several countries that were directly (the Balkans and the Iberian Peninsula) or indirectly (Poland) threatened by Muslim expansion. Machiavelli, in his Discourses, called Poland a fortress protecting Europe from Asian invasions. Erasmus of Rotterdam took up this idea, and Pope Urban VIII in 1627 conferred the title of stronghold of Christianity on Poland. Fifty years later, in 1678, Pope Innocent XI publicly declared that Poland is a ac illustre christianitatis Reipublicae propugnaculum (powerful and glorious stronghold of Christianity) (Brzozowski, M. (1990) "The Problem of the Nation in the Preaching of Archbishop Jan Pawel Woronicz, 1757-1829", in D. Loads, K. Walsh (eds) Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience, p. 143. Oxford: Blackwell).

page 47
Thus, the key provisions of the myth about the original Catholic character of Poland were established.

The Messianic martyrological myth was formed much later, in the 19th century, when Poland, divided between Russia, Prussia and Austria (1795-1918), disappeared from the map of Europe. The most influential creators of Polish Messianic martyrdom were not religious (or political) figures, but romantic poets who compared the partition of Poland to a crucifixion. In the writings of Adam Mickiewicz (1798-1855), Juliusz Slovak (1809-1849), and Zygmunt Krasinski (1812-1849), 7 Poland was presented as the "Christ among the nations": having been sacrificed for the sins of the world, it will rise again to save humanity from absolutism. This interpretation of the partition of Poland was combined with the prophetic revelation of a resurrection-like victory for Poland. This was discussed in poems, plays, and other writings: for example, in Mickiewicz's "Book of the Polish People and Polish Pilgrimage", a national - biblical parable first published anonymously in 1832 in the form of a missal and usually referred to as"Mickiewicz's Homilies". These Christian metaphors were also widely used in folk iconography, which contributed to the transfer of rich and difficult to understand romantic treatises into forms accessible to the mass consciousness. In addition, in the context of severe restrictions on education, publishing and freedom of organization, as well as the elimination of all Polish from public use, religious worship and religious practices provided Poles with a significant opportunity to strengthen their sense of community. 8 Although the Church never openly created or supported such a fusion of Catholicism with romantic Messiahship, the faith nevertheless became the "bearer" of what Eva Morawska called a "romantic civil religion." 9
7. In Polish, they are called Trzej wieszcze, which means both "three bards" and - quite significantly - "three prophets". All three belong to the national pantheon of founding fathers, martyrs and heroes.

8. Olszewski, D. (1996) Polska kultura religijna na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax; Kłoczowski, J. (2000) A History of Polish Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

9. Morawska, E. (1984) "Civil Religion vs. State Power in Poland", Society 21(4): 29-34.

page 48
Messianism provided not only a narrative framework for describing the situation of Poles during the partition, but also a context for interpreting Polish history as a whole. The Messianic vision of Poland as a martyr and savior has become a central narrative, or what Victor Turner called a "root paradigm" that relates "not only to the current state of social relations existing or developing between actors, but also to cultural goals, means, and goals."-

page 49
the ideas, attitudes, thought patterns, and belief patterns that are involved in these relationships determine their interpretation and choice in favor of alliance or separation. " 10 Messianic martyrdom gave meaning to events and social connections, offering an interpretive context in which they can be understood, and served as a semiotic center for the crystallization of religious and national symbols, the maturation of the scenario of collective revolt.11
In this perspective, the restoration of the Polish state in 1918 was considered and described as the" rebirth "of Poland (Polska odrodzona - Poland reborn), the Second World War was understood as the" fourth partition "of Poland and its new cross, and the communist period, which is commonly called the "fifth partition", as another crucifixion. Such an interpretive context brought with it emotionally charged analogies between the plight and painful experience of the lack of statehood during periods of partition; it also emphasized Poland's historical suffering, the church's supposed role in the nation's survival, the notion of Poles as the chosen people (lud polski ludem Bożym - "the Polish people are the people of God"), and Poland as a nation. on Antemurale Christianitatis, the Christian barrier protecting Europe from the atheist Soviet Union. The iconography of national identity and resistance to foreign oppression emphasized symbols that are traditionally associated with the struggle of the nation, such as the Black Madonna of Czestochowa or motifs borrowed from the Passions - the cross and the crown of thorns. The cross was a particularly significant element of the collective consciousness; together with other symbols, signs and gestures, it formed a language and provided a sacred space for expressing rebellion against the authorities. 12 At political demonstrations, crosses were carried as sacred shields designed to protect against reprisals; in 1980 and 1981, the giant-

10. Turner, V. (1974) Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society, p. 64. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

11. Kertzer, D.I. Ritual, Politics, and Power; Kubik, J. (1994) The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. Pennsylvania State University Press.

12. Rogozińska, R. (2002). W stronę Golgoty: inspiracje pasyjne w sztuce polskiej w latach 1970-1999, s. 28. Poznań: Księgarnia Św. Wojciecha.

page 50
These crosses commemorate the victims of the 1956 Poznan Uprising and the 1970 Coastal strikes.13
This specific narrative configuration in the post-war era was formed and developed in a new context -

13. These were official, state-funded commemorative monuments, which attests to the power of the symbol and the relative weakness of the (atheist) party state.

page 51
in a country that has become a uniformly Catholic nation14, where the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, strong with the moral capital accumulated during World War II, tried not to capitulate to the harsh pressure of the new regime. Moreover, by that time the church hierarchy (for reasons beyond the scope of this article) had adopted a romantic discourse of martyr messianism, which it had previously rejected as sacrilegious.15 Thus, by the middle of the XX century. two national-

14. For most of its history, Poland has been inhabited by peoples belonging to different ethnic, linguistic and religious communities. The Second World War dramatically changed this situation. Thus, Jews, who made up about ten percent of the population in 1931, were exterminated during the Holocaust or emigrated after the war; many survivors were targeted by brutal pogroms (Gross, J. T. (2006) Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after the Holocaust. New York: Random House) or a state-sponsored anti-Semitic campaign [in 1967-1968- ] (Stola, D. (2000) Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967-1968. Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk). The borders of the Polish state shifted westward after World War II: the Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian minorities became part of the Soviet Union, and the German population in the West was expelled. As a result, ethnic Poles, who made up about 65 percent of the population of the Second Republic before the war, represented about 95 percent of the population of Poland by 1946. Since ethnic and religious affiliations tend to mix in this part of the world, the religious appearance of the population also changed dramatically during and after the war: in 1931, Catholics made up approximately 65 percent of the Polish population; by 1946, the proportion of Catholics had increased to 96 percent of the population living within the new borders (Michowicz, W. (1988) "Problem mniejszości narodowych", in J. Tomicki (red.) Polska Odrodzona, 1918-1939, ss. 285-321. Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna; Tomaszewski, J. (1993) "The national question in Poland in the twentieth century", in M. Teich, R. Porter (eds) The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, pp. 293-316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

15. Romantic Messianism, first formulated in the nineteenth century, was considered non-Catholic and even considered heretical by some, as it promised an earthly incarnation of the divine (Porter, B. (2000) When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland, p. 28. New York: Oxford University Press). The "Mickiewicz Homilies", for example, were condemned by a papal edict for using religious motives to justify what the church considered a radical social program: it implied the abolition of serfdom and the proclamation of universal civil rights, including for women and Jews ("Adam Mickiewicz", Culture.pl [http://www.culture.pl/en/culture/artykuly/os_mickiewicz_adam, accessed on 21.04.2009]). Since the Holy See recognized the partitions of Poland, church hierarchs instructed Polish Catholics to focus their thoughts on the eternal, and leave earthly affairs to the anointed authorities-the rulers of the partition era (Żywczyński, M. (1935, 1995) Watykan wobec Powstania Listopadowego. Cracow: Universitas; Porter, B. When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland, p. 31). However, the position of the hierarchs and the Vatican was balanced by the commitment of the lower clergy to the national cause (Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World, p. 93. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.).

page 52
These two myths - about Poland's original Catholic character and its Messianic martyrdom-are intertwined into a solid national mythology, equipped with a rich repertoire of practices and symbols: a mythology supported by recent historical experience, supported by an influential institution, and directed against a regime imposed from outside and above.

Two caveats are necessary here. First, by defining this dominant narrative as "mythology" and thus identifying the historical process of its formation, I do not mean to say that Catholicism did not have a formative impact on Polish culture or that the Catholic Church did not play a significant role in Polish history. Obviously, both were the case. The Catholic Church was a key player in state affairs long before the Polish State disappeared from the map of Europe in 1795,16 and continued to be a major social institution and political actor during the periods of partition, World War II, and under the Communists. Although there is no doubt that the Catholic Church occupied an important place in the national life and that Catholicism determined the daily life of the Polish population, national mythology overestimates both the role of Catholicism in determining national identity and the role of the Catholic Church as the guardian of the nation - especially in the periods before the beginning of the XX century. Catholicism became a central element of Polish national identity and ideology and established itself as a national political program only by the end of the 19th century, and mainly during the 20th century. Although today the vast majority of the Polish population is Catholic, for most of Polish history the religious landscape was very different. I want to emphasize here precisely the specific status of this narrative, its quasi-sacral character, which forms the national identity and presentation of oneself in the face of Others. This is not only an academic question, because mythology, as I will show, determines the understanding of the present 17.

16. For example, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795), which was an elective monarchy, the Archbishop of Gniezno and Primate of Poland served as an interrexus, exercising power between the death of the king and the election of his successor.

17. According to Bryan Porter, the myth of Poland's essential Catholicism had a particularly strong - and dubious - impact on collective memory and historiography, as it attached "a specific meaning to the past and subtext-

page 53
Second, although this mythology dominates the Polish public sphere, it is by no means the only leading one. There is a long-standing tension between the religious and secular visions of the nation, and those who support either vision use historical narratives or myths to promote their respective political projects.18 For example, after the defeat of the uprising of 1863-1864, romantic messianism was debunked by a new generation of writers and public figures as naive and destructive: they argued that it was necessary to work in existing political structures in order to make the most of a bad situation. The "positivists" argued that the time had come to put aside idealism and Romanticism and become realists. The key to strengthening the nation is education and economic progress. However, this program failed to supplant or replace national Messianic martyrdom. By promoting reason and enlightenment instead of feelings and revolts, it has failed as such to develop aesthetics and mythologies that would overshadow the Messianic narrative and establish themselves as nationally dominant. Although the positivist national project had an impact on political processes, without the rich repertoire of symbols and Catholic practices that romantic Messianism possessed, it remained just an educational project.

a guide to defining what should be remembered and what should be Forgotten" (Porter, B. (2001) "The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History", The Slavic and East European Journal 45(2): 291). In recent years, considerable efforts have been made to "demythologize" Polish history and question the dominant belief in Poland's eternal and essential "Catholicity" (see Zubrzycki, G. (2006) The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland, pp. 34-76. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Bjork, J. (2008) Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). For an example of historiographical works that reproduce this myth, see Raina, P. (1985) Ko ści ół w Polsce. London: Veritas; Cywiński, B. (1993) Ogniem próbowane, vol. 1, Korzenie tożsamości. Warsaw: WSP; Cywiński, B. (1994) Ogniem próbowane, vol. 2, I was prześladować będą. Warsaw: WSP; for a discussion of the formative influence of this mythology on public and scientific discourse, see the introduction to the book: Porter-Szucs, B. (2012). Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland. New York: Oxford University Press.

18. Walicki, A. (1990) "The Three Traditions in Polish Patriotism", in S. Gomulka, A. Polonsky (eds) Polish Paradoxes, pp. 21-39. New York: Routledge; Zubrzycki, G. (2011) "History and the National Sensorium: Making Sense of Polish Mythology".

page 54
At the same time, depending on the specific structural conditions and features of the historical moment, some national myths turned out to be more significant and politically mobilizing than others. The myth of Poland as the "Christ among the Nations" is so powerful because for most of modern history, Poland has been under colonial rule or foreign occupation. This mythology has had plenty of time to become firmly rooted in the Polish collective imagination. If certain myths are particularly strong in certain contexts, then the restoration of national sovereignty in 1989 raised the question of what the fate of the myth of "always loyal Poland" will be now that Poles have their own sovereign national state. As will be shown below, the post-1989 period is marked by a debate about the place of the Catholic Church in the new State - a debate in which the dominant national mythology was used by some forces and attacked by others, depending on the political goals pursued.

Polonia ? Vadis, quo nation: self-determination state,Perestroika*

The post-communist period in Poland is often seen as the final phase of the struggle for independence. As a result, this transition period was understood by Poles primarily in a national sense: its characteristic features were not only the democratization and establishment of a market economy, but also the construction of a national state - a state of Poles and for Poles, to borrow the formulation of Rogers Brubaker 19. In the context of this project, it is necessary to explore the question of what exactly constitutes Polish identity and what role Catholicism plays in defining the symbolic boundaries of the Polish national spirit. Now that Poland has been resurrected, what should be the place of the Catholic Church in the new political environment?

In the first years of the post-communist transition period, the Church quickly went on the offensive, widely and directly.-

* Where are you going, Poland? (Latin).
19. Brubaker, R. (1996) Reframing Nationalism: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press.

page 55
but by interfering in politics. It publicly supported certain candidates and political parties, publishing lists of "correct" candidates that "good Catholics" were supposed to vote for. She also voiced her opinions and organized a powerful political lobby on issues that were important to her, such as the return of compulsory religious education to public schools, respect for Christian values in the media, the concordat with the Vatican, and the ban on abortion (if you limit yourself to mentioning only the most important topics discussed in the public sphere). Indicative of the church's involvement in politics was a statement made by Bishop Michalik during the 1991 election campaign:

It would be wrong for a Catholic nation to find itself once again in a situation where it will have to be governed by a non-Christian parliament... I often repeat, and I am ready to repeat it again: a Catholic must vote for a Catholic... muslim for Muslim, Jew for Jew, mason for mason, communist for communist 20.

Throughout the 1990s, right-wing Catholics and the official ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church, arguing that a Christian nation should have a Christian state, emphasized the" objective " homogeneity of the Polish population (96% Catholics and 95% ethnic Poles) and emphasized the historical role of the church in national survival. Public intellectuals and left-wing politicians, centrists, and liberal Catholics, on the other hand, emphasized the ideological heterogeneity of the nation and argued that since Catholicism is only one of many competing or overlapping value systems, the state should be confessionally neutral. Such a State, in their view, was (and still is) necessary to protect the rights of minorities, atheists or non-practicing Catholics, and to maintain de jure and de facto equality of citizens. In turn, this position was qualified by Archbishop Michalik as "democratic totalitarianism", because the non-believing minority would determine the direction of the constitutional process, and the overwhelming majority of Poles would follow it.21
20. Journal of Więż, no 1, 1992.

21. Abp Michalik, "Nasza Polska", 19.02.1997.

page 56
Such discussions were conducted in the context and as a result of the radical opening up of the institutional boundaries of public discourse after the fall of communism. This had profoundly detrimental consequences for the Church: its authority in the public sphere declined markedly as society liberalized and its institutional diversity increased. The establishment of a democratic State governed by the rule of law destroyed the old model of relations between the church and civil society and led to the formation of a new dynamic. Its characteristic features were the church's loss of influence and its attempt to compensate for this loss by strengthening its institutional position in the state. However, the latter came into conflict with the expectations of a certain part of the population, which now had a different idea of what the role of the church should be in a "free Poland".

The church's aggressive, interventionist style of activity has provoked a serious backlash. Support for the church's actions fell from 90% in 1989 to a record low of 38% in 19932. In surveys conducted regularly throughout the nineties, three-quarters of Poles were dissatisfied with the fact that the church speaks out about the political activities of the government, and 60% believed that the church should not disclose its opinion about the content and style of the media. In addition, about 60% of respondents believed that in the first eight years after the fall of communism, the church was excessively active in public activities23. Under the communist regime, church participation in political life was perceived as necessary; however, it quickly became clear that excessive involvement in politics was perceived as unacceptable for a fully sovereign and democratic Poland and was costly for the church.

Ситуация после 1989 года поставила церковь перед многими вызовами, но она сумела оправиться от ошибок, допущенных в начале девяностых. К концу десятилетия поддержка деятельности церкви стабилизировалась на уровне более 50% и коле-

22. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (1999). Kościół w III Rzeczyspospolitej. Warsaw: SBOS; Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (2004). "Stabilizacja opinii o wpływie Kościoła na życie w kraju". Warsaw: SBOS.

23. Zdaniewicz, W., Zembrzuski, T. (eds) (2000) Kościół i religijność Polaków 1945-1999, s. 435. Warsaw: Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego, Pallotinum.

page 57
During 2000-2010, it was estimated to be in the range of almost 60 to 65% 24. Today, the church hierarchy is more cautious in its political assessments, but its conservative wing has found powerful allies - and partners-in social and political mobilization.

The most obvious and visible allies of the church are Radio Maria, that " Catholic voice in your home "(according to the main slogan of the radio), and political parties like the League of Polish Families or the conservative, grassroots Law and Justice party, which came to power in 2015. Members of these parties and organizations are notable for using religious discourses and symbols as tools to restore the "us vs. them" model; this model worked successfully as a means of mass mobilization under communism, but now it hinders constructive, consensual institutional development. These forces were powerful enough to ban gay pride parades in Warsaw, and they still manage to maintain strict laws banning abortions or requiring the presence of a crucifix in the National Assembly.

So, in modern Poland, the church remains a key political player, even if it no longer has the same authority as it did under the communist regime. Although its direct involvement in politics is not supported by the majority of Poles, Catholicism still occupies an important place in their lives: more than 90% of Polish citizens call themselves believers, 87% participate in divine services several times a year, and 50% go to church at least once a week25. These trends are true even for young people (18-24 years old), 85% of whom describe themselves as "believers" and almost half attend religious services on a weekly basis. If the number of practicing believers in this group is comparable to the national average (about 50% attend services weekly), then it has decreased in comparison with the level that was observed in the early nineties in the same group. At that time, more than two-thirds of Poles between the ages of 18 and 24 attended services at least once.

24. Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (2004). Stabilizacja opinii o wpływie Kościoła na życie w kraju; Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (2012). Oceny Instytucji publicznych. Warsaw: SBOS.

25. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (2015). Zmiany w zakresie podstawowych wskaźników Religijności Polaków po śmierci Jana Pawła II. Warsaw: CBOS.

page 58
once a week 26. At the same time, only 18% of Poles aged 18-24 say they do not participate in any religious services at all. (This figure increased from 10% in 2005 to 18% in 2014.) Finally, about 85% of Poles with higher education consider themselves believers (osoba wierząca), and almost half of them admit that they attend services at least once a week (about 45% - once a week and about 25 % - several times a week).27.

Although Poles remain strikingly religious, 28 and Catholicism continues to be a rich source of symbols and practices that nationalists manipulate for political purposes, in the next two sections we will see that there is an increasingly clear opposition to the Catholic vision of Poland in politics, social movements, and the arts. Liberal intellectuals try to re-raise the question of the relationship between church and society and somewhat reorient Polish national identity in a secular direction, presenting and promoting the principles of a civil nation and condemning the narrow ethno-religious understanding of the nation in their speeches,articles and book publishing activities. 29
Nevertheless, such a vision of the nation goes against the generally accepted national identity in Poland; moreover, sometimes this discourse is seen as echoing communist rhetoric, which significantly limits its mobilizing potential. Poeto-

26. Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (2009). Dwie dekady przemian religijnosci w Polsce. Warsaw, CBOS.

27. Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej (2015).

28. В других публикациях (Zubrzycki, G. (2001) "‘We, the Polish Nation': Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist Constitutional Debates", Theory and Society 30(5): 629-669; Zubrzycki, G. The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland; Zubrzycki, G. (2012) "Religion, Religious Tradition and Nationalism: Jewish Revival in Poland and ‘Cultural Heritage 'in Quebec", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 5(3): 442-465).such as self-determination as believers and participation in religious services) helps to sketch the overall picture of the Polish religious landscape, it is necessary to turn to qualitative methods in order to capture the small (and not only small) transformations taking place in the last two decades, and to understand the semantic shift in attitudes towards Catholicism and religiosity in different groups.

29. I am referring to the intellectuals associated with the weekly Polityka, Adam Michnik's Gazeta newspaper, and - to some extent-Tygodnik Powszechny magazine and Znak publishing house. Examples of their efforts can be found in the press, as well as in the discussion forums, seminars, and workshops they participate in and sometimes sponsor.

page 59
Many intellectuals try to present this point of view to the public by appealing to the proper Polish civic narrative of the sixteenth century with its religious tolerance, to the multiethnic state of the First Republic, 30 to the szlachta democracy and elective monarchy, to the Constitution of May 3, 1791, to the Polish legions that fought "for your and our freedom", and to the "Warsaw Pact". positivism " of the late 19th century. 31 In recent times, the emphasis on Poland's multicultural past and the Jewish contribution to Polish culture have intertwined in a narrative that promotes openness and Europeanness.32
Thus, the" truly Polish " secular project and the vision of the nation, which seems "alien" to many Poles, are presented to the population in a" soil-based " package, with references to various (glorious!) historical examples. The secular approach should gain legitimacy and appeal if it is shown to be firmly rooted in Polish history. This strategy is aimed at replacing the abstract concept of a civil nation, which is often understood and rejected by national Catholic circles as an anti-national (internationalist, cosmopolitan) and therefore anti-Polish and anti-Catholic ideology, with its more concrete historically Polish version. However, this narrative lacks a powerful aesthetic that could make it emotionally appealing to people. Although the myth of Polonia semper fidelis is increasingly challenged, it remains the dominant myth, which must either be defended or attacked. In any case, it is still at the center of public discourse and political life in today's Poland.

Mythology and politics tragedies

So far, I have discussed how the period of lack of statehood and various aspects of colonial oppression and occupation shaped the national mythology associated with Catholicism and Messianic martyrdom. In turn, this mytho-

30. The first Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth existed from 1569 to .
31. "Warsaw Positivism" - a literary and intellectual current of the late 19th century that developed after the uprising of .
32. Zubrzycki, G. "Religion, Religious Tradition and Nationalism: Jewish Revival in Poland and ‘Cultural Heritage' in Quebec"; Zubrzycki, G. (2016). "Nationalism, ‘Philosemitism' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland", Comparative Studies in Society and History 58(1): 66-98.

page 60
logia has created a repertoire of narratives, symbols, and tools for interpreting Polish history, which politics focuses on. I have said that the fall of communism and the attainment of national independence have called into question the centrality of the Catholic Church in political affairs and in the public sphere. Now I want to change the subject abruptly and turn to the analysis of a key "event" of the last decade, in which mythology, religion and politics are once again organically intertwined: the plane crash on April 10, 2010 near Smolensk, in western Russia. 33 On that plane were President Lech Kaczynski, his wife Maria, several dozen parliamentarians, top military officials and other public figures. No one survived the crash, which reportedly claimed ninety-six lives. The Smolensk tragedy served as an incentive for the activation of right-wing forces, as well as prompted centrists and leftists to re-open discussions about secularism and the relationship between church and state. Because "Smolensk" was the event around which the most significant debates about religion and politics were conducted (after the constitutional disputes of 199734 and the" war of the crosses " in Auschwitz35), it is important for us to take a closer look at it.

Just a few hours after the plane crash, the media and speeches widely referred to the tragedy as the "second Katyn". This included both the event itself and the place where the VIP delegation was heading to pay tribute to the memory of about twenty thousand prisoners-Polish officers, intellectuals and civilians who were shot by the Soviet NKVD in 1940. The Archbishop of Krakow, Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz, soon announced that the president and his wife would be buried in the cathedral of the Royal Wawel Castle in Krakow, where kings and the greatest national heroes rest. At a press conference, the cardinal explained that, " of course, President Kaczynski deserved to be buried in the Cathedral of Wa-

33. "Smolensk" is an "event": a certain sequence of events and their interpretation that circulates in the public sphere and shapes modern politics (for the concept of "events", see: Sewell, W. H. Jr. (1996)"Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille", Theory and Society 25: 841-881). By "Smolensk" I mean the plane crash itself, the conspiracy theories associated with it, the demonstration of national mourning, and the protest against specific forms of commemoration.

34. Zubrzycki, G. "‘We, the Polish Nation': Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist Constitutional Debates".

35. Zubrzycki, G. The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland.

page 61
velya, because he died in extraordinary circumstances - heroically already because... That I flew to Katyn to honor the memory of national martyrs on behalf of the nation."36 The death of President Kaczynski was officially embedded in the powerful narrative of Katyn martyrdom, the "Calvary of the East", connecting with the myth of Poland's original Catholicism. In addition to being buried in Wawel Cathedral, a piece of the wreckage of the presidential plane was anchored in the latest ceremonial vestments of the Czestochowa Madonna - hidden in the folds of the Infant Jesus ' robes; and the cross erected in front of the Presidential Palace in the first days after his death became a true totem of Poland's deep Catholic character.

This cross, put up by the Boy Scouts in memory of the victims of the plane crash, was at the center of the "war for the cross" in the summer of 2010. An agreement was reached between the state and church authorities that on August 3 a religious procession would move it to the nearest church. But the self-proclaimed "Defenders of the Cross" used force and did not allow this ritual transfer, even under the control of the church, because they saw it as a desecration of the symbol and an insult to the nation. The controversial cross has provided a visible foothold for supporters of traditional Catholic Poland and at the same time a pretext for protesting against the religiously nationalist Poland that it became a symbol of in the aftermath of the collapse of communism.

A parody of the "Defenders of the Cross" and a mockery of them and their crusade against the secular state was a flash mob called " Do they want a circus? Let's give them a circus! " the group announced on Facebook, calling on its members to protest. Within a few hours, more than eight thousand Facebook users confirmed their participation in the flash mob. The Catholic radio station Radio Maria countered the blow by calling on its listeners, especially men, to counter-demonstrate against the counter-demonstrators. The city authorities mobilized the police, preparing for the worst. TV reporters installed their equipment, and regular news programs were canceled due to the broadcast of the "special event". The streets in the center of Warsaw were flooded-

36. Newsweek.pl, 13.04.2010. The decision to bury President Kaczynski and the first lady in the crypt of Wawel Cathedral put an end to a rare show of unity in mourning: loud protests were organized immediately after Cardinal Dziwisz's statement.

page 62
They were surrounded by people: people were praying, protesting, having fun, having fun, or just looking around under strict police surveillance and under television cameras. The organizers of the flash mob specifically asked participants not to bring any national flags and posters, or religious symbols, to emphasize the insignificance of the self-proclaimed "Defenders of the Cross" and their claims. Accompanying the protest with national symbols would have meant legitimizing the "war for the cross", while the flash mob's goal was just the opposite: to demonstrate the marginality of the" Defenders of the Cross " and the absurdity of their campaign. Therefore, participants were advised to come in carnival costumes, prepare funny chants, dance and play beach volleyball. The space around the Presidential Palace became a grotesque theater: small groups of worshippers sang religious and patriotic hymns, and protesters loudly played musical hits; elderly "Defenders of the Cross" tied themselves to the cross with flags, and protesting young people laughed at them, starting a" war for the cross " in the form of pillow fights; some declared their readiness to die for the cross, others displayed T-shirts that read: "Where the cross is, there's a party!" or waved placards: "The Presidential Palace casts a shadow on the cross - let's blow up the palace!" TV viewers saw among the "Protestants" characters representing Elvis Presley and the Pope.

Cracks in to the rock: faults inside churches

The "standoff" near the Presidential Palace lasted several weeks that summer and became the main news in the media. Like the" war of the crosses "at Auschwitz, the" defense of the Smolensk Cross " was organized by a group of marginals, but the action received enough support to disrupt the planned transfer of the cross. I want to emphasize the radicalism of these Polish Catholics, as they called themselves: they thwarted the movement of the cross authorized by the Church-moving in a ritual procession led by Roman Catholic priests. The "Defenders of the Cross" loudly and publicly accused these priests of national treachery and physically blocked the procession, preventing the ritual transfer. Thus, the "war for the Smolensk Cross" not only highlighted the polarization between ethno-Catholic and civil-secular nationalists, it also clearly showed how deep the divisions are

page 63
inside the church and how far to the right the position of "Defenders of the Cross" and "Radio Maria"is shifted.

As I said above, building a sovereign and democratic State has driven a wedge between the church and civil society. It has also highlighted and exacerbated tensions that have been hushed up in the past. After 1989, what appeared to be a monolith turned out to be a mosaic; old contradictions, pushed aside by the need for unity that existed under communism, came to the surface, and new cracks were added to them. The Catholicism of the clergy and faithful today is clearly divided into three main areas:" open", traditionally conservative and" closed " Catholicism 37.

The most popular direction, much ahead of the rest, is traditionally conservative. This Catholicism positions itself as a Continuity Catholicism; it was supported by the head of the Polish Episcopate, Cardinal Glemp (d. 2013), Archbishop Michalik, most of the clergy and many political figures. It is characterized by the active involvement of Catholicism in national life, while the nation is understood as a divine community, and the church as its holy guardian. According to traditionally conservative Catholics, the peculiarity of the Polish way of life consists mainly in the close connection between religion and national identity.

In contrast to the traditional model of Catholicism, which emphasizes the public dimension of faith and politicizes religion, "open" Catholics focus on its private aspects: on the deepening of faith, on its active interiorization. According to them, traditional Catholicism is too closely connected with secular emotions, it has become a political religion.-

37. This typology is inspired by the works of: Gowin, J. (2000) Kościół w czasach wolności 1989-1999. Cracow: Znak; Gowin, J. (1995) Kościół po komunizmie. Cracow: Znak; о Католической церкви после 1989, см.: Grabowska, M. (1992) "L'Église de Pologne à un tournant", in P. Michel (ed.) Les religions à l'Est, pp. 109-127. Paris: Ed. du Cerf; Morawska, E. (1995) "The Polish Roman Catholic Church Unbound: Change of Face or Change of Context?", in S.E. Hanson, W. Spohn (eds) Can Europe Work? Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies, pp. 47-75. Seattle: University of Washington Press; Pawlik, W. (1995) "The Church and its Critics: The Spell of the Polish Ombudsman", Polish Sociological Review 1: 31-45; Grosfield, J. (ed.) (1996) Kościół wobec integracji europejskiej. Warsaw: Societas; Graczyk, R. (1999) Polski Kościół-polska demokracja. Cracow: Universitas..

page 64
2. "Open" Catholics warn against the fusion of nation and religion, emphasizing not the exclusivity of Polish Catholicism, but the universality of the Catholic faith. They also consistently promote the principles of the Second Vatican Council and ecumenism. "Open" Catholics are mainly associated with the" liberal " Catholic press, with groups such as Tygodnik Powszechny ("Universal Weekly"), publishing house Znak, Club of Catholic Intellectuals and magazine Więż ("Svyaz").

The last direction in order, but not in importance, is the Catholics on the opposite side of the continuum: the so-called "closed" Catholics, personified recently in the person of Father Jankowski and Father Rydzyk-the founder and director of Radio Maria, which causes so much controversy. This trend is quite noticeable, although it does not determine the appearance of Catholicism in Poland. However, it is perhaps the most prominent media outlet that makes its presence felt and fills the public space thanks to a powerful media resource - Radio Maria and related publications such as Nasz Dziennik ("Our Daily") and Nasza Polska ("Our Poland"). These media outlets have a significant influence on the external aspect of Polish Catholicism, fixing terms and corresponding positions and thereby setting the boundaries of public discussion. This influence was clearly felt during the "war for the Smolensk Cross" and still lasts, as conspiracy theories related to the events in Smolensk and spread by these media outlets flood Poland. The voice of Radio Maria is the voice of anti-communism, anti-liberalism and anti-Semitism. Like the traditionalists, but more vociferously using symbolic politics, "closed" Catholics see the nation as a creation of God, which must be protected by the state. They consider themselves to be" true "Catholics and" true "Poles, whereas "open" Catholics, in their view, are "faded" Catholics and " bad " Poles, or even hidden Jews. So they accused the priests who tried to move the Smolensk cross of being " Jewish."

The wooden cross was moved later that same fall of 2010, after difficult negotiations and after the installation of cement blocks around it, which prevented its "defenders" from approaching it. A small group of "defenders of the Cross", members of the "Radio Maria Family", continued to rally nearby. Under the guidance of a priest, the group members spend six evenings a week

page 65
They brought a wooden cross, set up a temporary altar, and prayed for the return of the "real Poland", while passers-by either ignored them, argued with them, or taunted the group members.38 After the victory of the Law and Justice party in the 2015 elections, Jaroslaw Kaczynski promised to return the cross to the same place and erect a monument to his brother Lech and the victims of the"Smolensk attack".

38. I conducted on-site surveillance during about a dozen nightly prayer vigils in July 2010, May-June 2011, March 2012, and September 2012.

page 66
New The Messiah?

The" war " for the Smolensk cross focused on disputes about the place of religious symbols in the public sphere: disputes that were fought between social actors-politicians, church authorities, ordinary citizens - and in which the vision of a secular Poland was formed. This "war" gave rise to various civil initiatives and petitions against the presence of the cross in this particular place and for a stricter separation of church and state in Poland. Although these civic initiatives had no political consequences, the "war for the Smolensk Cross" brought a new "star" to the political horizon - Janusz Palikot, a colorful and provocative deputy from the Civic Platform party who made a fortune in the production of alcoholic beverages. Palikot publicly opposed the installation of the Smolensk cross in the summer and autumn of 2010, and later created his own party, the Palikot Movement, which stood on a secular-anti-clerical platform and published a program manifesto called "Modern State". The manifesto proposed removing religious education from public schools, ending government subsidies and tax breaks for religious institutions, legalizing voluntary abortions, allowing same-sex civil unions, introducing free distribution of condoms, and legalizing the use of marijuana. In Gdynia, openly gay MP Robert Bedron was elected, but the real surprise was the election of Anna Grodzka, the first transgender MP in European history, in conservative Krakow. Published after the election on October 18, 2011, the Wpost news weekly featured a profile picture of Palikot, Grodzka, and Bedron (which visually resembled the famous Communist iconography of Engels, Marx, and Lenin) with the caption: "The Palikot Revolution: Will they change politics, the church and the Poles?". The Newsweek Polska issue featured a polaroid photo collage depicting Palikot as a crucifix, with the caption: "Palikot: The Messiah of the Left?"

page 67
The Palikota Movement won a fantastic ten percent in the 2011 parliamentary elections, coming in third place behind Donald Tusk's Civic Platform (39.2%) and Jaroslaw Kaczynski's Law and Justice Party (29.9%). However, already in 2015, the "Movement" did not get into the Sejm. Despite the ephemeral nature of the "Movement", it clearly expressed the values and political expectations of a certain segment of Polish society. The Palikota Movement was most popular among young and non-religious people: 42% of Poles aged 18 to 44 voted for it, and 37% of those who do not attend or rarely visit the church39. However, if we take into account the data on the number of believers given above,

39. Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej (2011). Wyborcy Ruchu Palikota. Warsaw: SBOS.

page 68
it turns out that a significant number of those who supported the movement were Religious and practicing Catholics. This suggests that their support for the Palikot was due to their rejection of the church's involvement in state affairs, and indicates what sociologists of religion call "privatization", i.e. the separation of the public and private spheres and the belief that religion belongs to the private sphere of life.

Palikot led his crusade against crosses, arguing in 2011 that the cross is not a national symbol, and therefore the crucifix should be removed from the National Assembly.40 Indeed, arguments for keeping the crucifix and other crosses in the public sphere have often been based on the fact that it is not a religious symbol, but a national and purely cultural one.41 Another argument for maintaining the presence of this particular crucifix in the Sejm was its historical connection with another sacred symbol, Pope John Paul II, who addressed the National Assembly in 1998. As Anna Sobieska, a member of the League of Polish Families, said,"it is obvious to us Catholics that the cross should be everywhere, and especially in the Polish Parliament, which was visited by the Holy Father." 42
The Palikota Movement also promoted acts of apostasy, providing essential information to Poles who wish to formally sever ties with the Catholic Church, and helping them begin the complex and lengthy bureaucratic process. Many websites and Facebook pages today provide individual support in this process; newspapers often discuss this "trend" and interview apostates who explain their decision and its motivations, as well as how their lives have changed for the better.43 These organizations are spon-

40. Gazeta Wyborcza, 13.10.2011.

41. See my analysis of the secularization of religious symbols and their re-sacralization as national symbols: a discussion of "sacred / secular symbols" (Zubrzycki, G. (2006) The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland, pp. 222-224, 219-222; Zubrzycki, G. (2010) "Crossing the Sacred Secular", The Immanent Frame [http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/05/14/crossing-the-sacred-secular/, accessed on 8.05.2012]).

42. Gazeta Wyborcza, 01.01.2012.

43. See, for example, http://www.apostazja.pl, http://www.apostazja.info/ and http://www.wolnoscodreligii.pl/, which contains information about the procedure, links to the necessary documents and expresses support for Catholics who want to leave the church.

page 69
Together with the Palikot Movement, they organized "Apostate Weeks "("Weeks of Apostasy"), during which Catholics could collectively fill out documents to leave the church. It is impossible (yet) to assess the importance of this phenomenon. The procedure takes a long time, and the church does not publish relevant statistics. However, this phenomenon is very actively discussed in the media, and oral evidence suggests that although this trend is not leading, it is strong enough for several organizations to devote themselves to this type of activity.

Finally, Palikot was a participant and sponsor of protests against the already mentioned connection between church and state. On March 8, 2012, on International Women's Day, he marched with a placard demanding to "cut the umbilical cord" that connects church and state and suffocates women.

page 70
In its heyday in 2011-2012. Palikot became the main voice of anti-clericalism. On Friday, November 16, 2012, his party officially introduced a bill for the complete secularization of the Polish state, and although the party went into the shadows after the 2015 elections, the problems that Palikot raised in the public sphere, which relate to the unacceptable closeness of church and state, remain an important topic of public discussion. The new Committee for the Defense of Democracy, established in 2015, is particularly drawn to these stories.

Kulturnaya Street War: mohair trees berets, sadovye dads mascots and thorns crowns

"Put on your beret, Grandma,
Yours, the mohair one.
After all, every Sunday
It's like you're going to war."

Big Cyc rock Band

Perhaps because Poland has a long history of colonial oppression and does not trust official political channels, politics is largely carried out outside the walls of political institutions: on the square in front of the Presidential Palace, in churches, on Facebook pages and Radio Maria waves, on the streets, in cafes and galleries. Radio Maria and its charismatic leader, Father Tadeusz Rydzyk, managed to organize a right-wing social movement.44 Although both leftists and liberal Catholics often accuse Father Rydzyk of creating a sect bordering on heresy, he is steadily gaining an army of devout followers, mostly made up of elderly women who have almost no other resources than free time. They cast their votes for the cause of a "real Poland": a Catholic Poland free of "Jews, Freemasons, Satanic secularists and communists."

In 2005, speaking in the National Assembly, then-Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the unofficial koali-

44. Jasiewicz, K. (1999) "Democratic Transition and Social Movements in Poland: From Solidarnosc to Rodzina Radia Maryja", Paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. St. Louis, Nov. 18-21, 1999; Krzemiński, I. (ed.) (2009) Czego nas uczy Radio Maryja? Warszawa: WAiP.

page 71
coalition between the parties "Law and Justice", "Self-defense" and "League of Polish Families" by a coalition of mohair berets 45. Thus, he officially designated the Radio Maria support group with a derogatory nickname (which is still used in wide circles of the population), referring to the headdress popular with older Polish women, but at the same time alluding to the green and blue berets of special forces units.:

The coalition you create is a coalition based on a lack of trust in others. This is a coalition built on uncertainty, on disrespect for the rule of law, disrespect for norms and principles that are recognized as obvious in Europe. The coalition between the parties "Law and Justice", "Self-defense" and "League of Polish Families" is also an anti-European coalition... Poland is not predestined to be what we now call a " Mohair coalition." Poland has a chance for a coalition that can restore hope for Polish national pride, for true Polish patriotism - a patriotism that is not xenophobic, not defensive, not suffering from distrust of the outside world.46
Radio Maria and its supporters quickly and consciously adopted the nickname as an honorific of their beliefs and political goals. The mohair beret, the object of ridicule by young people and liberals, has become a symbol of the influence of older women who do not sit silently at home, but take to the streets to fight for the Poland they want to see. In 2009, Father Rydzyk called on his supporters to impose miniature berets and distribute them during the pilgrimage to Czestochowa; since then, this practice has become part of the repertoire of regular actions of the Radio Maria Family. Professor Bohuslav Volnevich, a conservative philosopher, pinned such a beret on the lapel of his jacket during an appearance on TV Trwam (TV" Stay": a TV channel associated with Radio Maria), declaring himself "the first knight of the Order of the Mohair Beret". Since then, Father Rydzyk often pins a mohair mini-beret to his cassock. His female followers knit and distribute approximately half a million mini-berets annually.47
45. Polsk. Moherowe berety. - note.

46. See the full speech of Donald Tusk: http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/main/34EACE52 (accessed from 08.09.2016).

47. Gazeta Wyborcza, 02.02.2012.

page 72
So the mini-beret became a symbol of this group, regardless of the gender, age or education of its members. This is a symbol of conservative Poland, and some of the mini-berets directly indicate this. They are woven with narrow strips of paper with the inscription: "I love God, the Church and Poland." Mini-berets also remind their owners of the contempt with which they are treated by centrists and leftists. As such, they have become an important part of the political uniform and a sign of belonging to the group. Although the terms "mohair coalition" and "mohair berets"are no longer used in politics and some publications avoid them, they are still used in popular culture, often in an abbreviated form: "mohair".

It was these "mohairs" that street artist Peter Fuss targeted. In a series of posters titled "Sometimes I'm Ashamed to be a Pole", he ranks kitsch, bad taste, homophobia, and mohair "Radio Maria"as idioms for what's wrong with Poland and in Poland. 48 In recent years, it is the visual arts that have sharply criticized Catholicism and the Catholic Church. Many contemporary artists attack the ethno-Catholic vision of Poland, highlighting its blind spots and denouncing its perversity. In several art installations, Fuss demonstrates the transformation of the national myth of Poland's essential Catholicism into a commodity: this myth is stronger, the artist proves, than the true depth of religious feelings of most Poles. At the Santo Subito49 exhibition, Fuss displayed dozens of "mascot garden popes" figurines on the floor, placing them between images of John Paul II projected onto the surrounding walls. On one wall - photos of kitschy souvenirs and trinkets with the image of the pope: watches, glass balls, souvenir spoons, decorative plates, cup holders, pillows, fountain pens, key chains, plastic bags, etc. On the other wall-photos of fifty-seven monuments to John Paul II in Poland. To journalists who asked Fuss to explain his "obsession" with the pope, he replied that it was not obsession, but "a reaction to the reality around me... For the mass of people, John Paul II is more of an idol, a superstar, than a spiritual leader: after all, paradoxically, they are very close to God.

48. This work can be viewed on the artist's website: http://peterfuss.com/sometimes/index.html (accessed from 08.09.2016).

49. "Saint right now" is the slogan of supporters of the immediate canonization of John Paul II, without following the necessary procedure. - note.

page 73
little is known of his teaching or of the papal encyclicals. People prefer to have images of the pope, not of Jesus Christ ... " 50.

In another installation, a giant nail - studded cross erected after the "war for the Smolensk Cross", Fuss transforms the cross from a symbol of Christian salvation and national redemption into a symbol of ethno - national suffering.

This idea was taken up by the artist Dorota Neznalskaya. Neznalska gained (notoriety) for her scandalous attacks on Polish national mythology and Catholicism, for which she was arrested, tried, and convicted.51 Her criticism is targeted

50. "Groundswell Talks: Peter Fuss", Groundswell 04.04.2008 [http://blog.groundswellcollective.com/2008/04/04/groundswell-talks-peter-fuss, accessed on 15.05.2011].

51. In the work" Passion", exhibited in 2001-2002, Neznalska plays with two meanings of this word: the Passion of Christ and physical passion. The installation consists of a cross-shaped wooden frame suspended from the ceiling, in the center of which is attached a photo of male genitalia, and a slowly moving male face in the video, expressing intense physical effort. According to art critic Izabella Kowalczyk, the installation reflects masculinity and exhaustion in the broad context of Poland's dominant Catholic culture ("Dorota Nieznalska", Culture.pl [http://www.culture.pl/pl/culture/artykuly/os_nieznalska_dorota, accessed on 11.06.2009]). (Photos of the installation can be found on the website http://www.artliberated.org/?id=20&p=cases but now they are no longer-

page 74
First of all, it is based on the symbols of national mythology and is most clearly expressed in the infamous sculptural images of crowns of thorns. Her most powerful work, the Kingdom installation, features a crown of thorns tied to a chain. A ball wrapped in a chain was often worn as a patriotic decoration in the 19th century; the ball and chain metaphorically depicted, in the conventional sense, the partitions of Poland as a loss of freedom and enslavement. Replacing the globe with a crown of thorns, Neznalska wants to say that the myth of martyrdom is a heavy burden that keeps the nation captive.

Final notes remarks

I started this article with a remark about the importance of national mythology in Poland , both in the historical perspective and in the present. However, the fall of communism, as I have shown, called this mythology into question and shook the position of the Catholic Church in the new political reality. The establishment of a sovereign State has indeed seriously undermined the political significance of the prevailing mythology, which has developed mainly in the context of statelessness and occupation; it has caused a sharp public reaction to the church's involvement in politics and deepened deep divisions within the church itself over its role and mission in the new Poland.

The dominant national mythology of Polonia semper fidelis no longer undermines the state, as it did under communism, but weakens civil society by dividing it. But while civil society is indeed polarized on religious and political issues, this polarization seems more radical than it is, because the voices of those who reject the separation of Church and State and unite around national mythology are the loudest. Rallying around Radio Maria, these people use broad and extensive social networks, develop their own media outlets, and recruit new members.52 However, these members are usually elderly people who have lost a lot during the transition to a market economy and are often unable to apply new tools and methods of work, which can lead to a decline in the number of employees.-

available). In 2003, Neznalska was found guilty of" insulting religious feelings " under article 196 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to six months of free community service. The artist appealed, the verdict was overturned, and six years later she was finally acquitted (04.06.2009).

52. Krzemiński, I. (ed.) Czego nas uczy Radio Maryja?

page 75
which are required by the new conditions. Their social and economic marginalization only increases their involvement in symbolic and traditionalist politics. Despite their flamboyance in the public sphere, they remain marginalized. Marginal at some point, they are once again becoming part of the mainstream, thanks to the power of national mythology and unexpected events on a national scale.

By actively promoting arguments for the preservation of religion in the public sphere and perpetuating the myth of Polish martyrdom with conspiracy theories - the "Russian attack" near Smolensk or the "Jewish conspiracy" to absorb Poland into the European Union-the Law and Justice party was able to come to power in 2015. This party uses the entire arsenal of means-more or less legal - to retain this power and to carry out its nationalist project. It is very difficult to predict how events will unfold in the future, but it is quite possible to argue that the political use of Catholicism and national mythology, as well as the established alliance of the Law and Justice Party with the conservative wing of the church and right-wing forces in Polish society, will contribute to a rather powerful response, not seen since the Solidarity centrist and left-wing forces.

Translation with english Halyna Vdovinoy

Bibliography / References

Sources

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (1999). Kościół w III Rzeczyspospolitej. Warsaw: Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej.

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (2004). Stabilizacja opinii o wpływie Kościoła na życie w kraju. Warsaw.

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (2009). Dwie dekady przemian religijnosci w Polsce. Warsaw: CBOS.

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (2011). Wyborcy Ruchu Palikota. Warsaw: CBOS.

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (2012). Oceny Instytucji publicznych. Warsaw: CBOS.

Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej. (2015). Zmiany w zakresie podstawowych wskaźników religijności Polaków po śmierci Jana Pawła II. Warsaw: CBOS

Wyszyński, S.C. (1996). Zapiski milenijne. Wybór z dziennika "Pro memoria" z lat 1965-1967. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo im. Stefana Kardynała Wyszyńskiego "Soli Deo".

Wyszyński, S.C. (1996). Na szlaku tysiąclecia. Wybór kazań. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo im. Stefana Kardynała Wyszyńskiego "Soli Deo".

page 76
Literature

Bjork, J. (2008) Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in a Central European Borderland. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Brubaker, R. (1996) Reframing nationalism: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Brzozowski, M. (1990) "The Problem of the Nation in the Preaching of Archbishop Jan Pawel Woronicz, 1757-1829" in D. Loades, K. Walsh (ed.) Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience, pp. 137-146. Oxford: Blackwell.

Casanova, J. (1994) Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Cywiński, B. (1993) Ogniem próbowane, vol. 1, Korzenie tożsamości. Warsaw: WSP.

Cywiński, B. (1994) Ogniem próbowane, vol. 2, I was prześladować będą. Warsaw: WSP.

Davies, N. (1982) God's Playground: A History of Poland, vol. 1: The Origins to 1795, vol. 2: 1795 to the Present. New York: Columbia University Press.

Davies, N. (1997) "Polish Mythologies", in G.A. Hosking, G. Schöpflin (eds) Myths and Nationhood. London: Routledge.

Gowin, J. (2000) Kościół w czasach wolności 1989-1999. Cracow: Znak.

Gowin, J. (1995) Kościół po komunizmie. Cracow: Znak.

Grabowska, M. (1992) "L'Église de Pologne à un tournant", in P. Michel (ed.) Les religions à l'Est, pp. 109-127. Paris: Ed. du Cerf.

Graczyk, R. (1999) Polski Kościół-polska demokracja. Cracow: Universitas.

Grosfield, J. (ed.) (1996) Kościół wobec integracji europejskiej. Warsaw: Societas.

Gross, J.T. (2006) Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after the Holocaust. New York: Random House.

Jasiewicz, K. (1999) "Democratic Transition and Social Movements in Poland: From Solidarnosc to Rodzina Radia Maryja", Paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. St. Louis, Nov. 18-21, 1999.

Kertzer, D.I. (1988) Ritual, Politics, and Power. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kłoczowski, J. (1991) Dzieje chrześcijaństwa polskiego. Paris: Editions du Dialogue.

Kłoczowski, J. (2000) A History of Polish Christianity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Krzemiński, I. (ed.) (2009) Czego nas uczy Radio Maryja? Warszawa: WAiP.

Kubik, J. (1994) The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. Pennsylvania State University Press.

Michowicz, W. (1988) "Problemy mniejszości narodowych", in J. Tomicki (red.) Polska Odrodzona, 1918-1939, ss. 285-321. Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna.

Morawska, E. (1984) "Civil Religion vs. State Power in Poland", Society 21(4): 29-34.

Morawska, E. (1995) "The Polish Roman Catholic Church Unbound: Change of Face or Change of Context?", in S.E. Hanson, W. Spohn (eds) Can Europe Work? Germany and the Reconstruction of Postcommunist Societies, pp. 47-75. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Olszewski, D. (1996) Polska kultura religijna na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax.

Osa, M. (1996) "Pastoral Mobilization and Contention: The Religious Foundations of the Solidarity Movement in Poland", in C. Smith (ed.) Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social-Movement Activism, pp. 67-85. New York: Routledge.

page 77
Pawlik, W. (1995) "The Church and its Critics: The Spell of the Polish Ombudsman", Polish Sociological Review 1: 31-45.

Porter, B. (2000) When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland. New York: Oxford University Press.

Porter, B. (2001) "The Catholic Nation: Religion, Identity, and the Narratives of Polish History", The Slavic and East European Journal 45(2): 289-299.

Porter-Szucs, B. (2012) Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland. New York: Oxford University Press.

Raina, P. (1985) Kościół w Polsce. London: Veritas.

Rogozińska, R. (2002). W stronę Golgoty: inspiracje pasyjne w sztuce polskiej w latach 1970-1999. Poznań: Księgarnia Św. Wojciecha.

Schöpflin, G. (1997) "The Function of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths", in G. Hosking, G. Schöpflin (eds) Myths and Nationhood, pp. 19-35. London: Hurst&Company.

Sewell, W.H.Jr. (1996) "Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille", Theory and Society 25: 841-881.

Smith, A.D. (1986) The Ethnic Origins of Nations. New York: Blackwell.

Smith, A.D. (1999) Myths and Memories of the Nation. London: Oxford University Press.

Stola, D. (2000) Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967-1968. Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

Tazbir, J. (1986) La République nobiliaire et le monde: Études sur l'histoire de la culture polonaise à l'époque du baroque. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk.

Tazbir, J. (1990) "The Polonization of Christianity in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in D. Loades, K. Walsh (eds) Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience, pp. 117-135. Oxford: Blackwell.

Tomaszewski, J. (1993) "The National Question in Poland in the Twentieth Century", in M. Teich, R. Porter (eds) The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, pp. 293-316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Turner, V. (1974) Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Walicki, A. (1990) "The Three Traditions in Polish Patriotism", in S. Gomulka, A. Polonsky (eds) Polish Paradoxes, pp. 21-39. New York: Routledge.

Zdaniewicz, W., Zembrzuski, T. (eds) (2000) Kościół i religijność Polaków 1945-1999. Warsaw: Instytut Statystyki Kościoła Katolickiego, Pallotinum.

Zubrzycki, G. (2001) "‘We, the Polish Nation': Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist Constitutional Debates", Theory and Society 30(5): 629-669.

Zubrzycki, G. (2006) The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Zubrzycki, G. (2010) "Crossing the Sacred Secular", The Immanent Frame [http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2010/05/14/crossing-the-sacred-secular/, accessed on 8.05.2012].

Zubrzycki, G. (2011) "History and the National Sensorium: Making Sense of Polish Mythology", Qualitative Sociology 34: 21-57.

Zubrzycki, G. (2012) "Religion, Religious Tradition and Nationalism: Jewish Revival in Poland and ‘Cultural Heritage' in Quebec", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 5(3): 442-465.

Zubrzycki, G. (2016). "Nationalism, ‘Philosemitism' and Symbolic Boundary-Making in Contemporary Poland", Comparative Studies in Society and History 58(1): 66-98.

Żywczyński, M. (1935, 1995) Watykan wobec Powstania Listopadowego. Cracow: Universitas.

page 78

Permanent link to this publication: